INTRODUCTION
It is easy to get lost. Law students enrolled in introductory antitrust courses know this well. Apparently, so does the judiciary. A broad "charter of freedom" 1 -the "Magna Carta of free enterprise" 2 -the Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade," and condemns "every person who shall monopolize" any commercial market. 3 In that single legislative stroke more than a century ago, Congress both attended to public outcry over ravaging cartels and sent the judiciary on an expedition into the "wilds of economic theory." 4 There is little doubt that Congress intended economic regulation under the Sherman Act to develop with flexibility-case-by-case, claim-by-claim. 5 Yet, given *. J.D., 2019, Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2016, Indiana University -Indianapolis. Foremost thanks to my wife, Mariana Lopez-Owens, for her patient and unending support. Very special thanks also to Professor Shana Wallace for helpful feedback and invaluable mentorship. Finally, gratitude to Professor Dawn Johnsen and the hardworking staff of the Indiana Law Journal. 661-63 (1982) (arguing that to afford flexibility, "Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a common-law refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general Perhaps more than ever, the vagueness of the Sherman Act's text needs a remedy that a century's worth of judicial gloss has failed to provide. Reliance on the customary techniques of judicial reasoning may now make less sense; 8 the modernization of our economy demands a modernized antitrust regime. 9 Decided upon more than one hundred years ago, the primarily post-hoc, increasingly factintensive adjudicative approach sent the judiciary roving through the complexities of competition economics with far less than a statutory Polaris. 10 And after a centuryplus long foray into the complexities of economic competition, it is even possible that the judiciary has plunged into the "sea of unconstitutionality." 11 statutory directions").
6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 104 (2016).
7. Id. at 107 (emphasis added). Of course, the Sherman Act has been supplemented by other statutes-notably, "the equally cryptic Clayton Act." Id.; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 301, at 6-7. " [T] he use of unelaborated common law words and references seems simply to have invested the federal courts with a new jurisdiction." AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 301, at 6. On one hand, "the Sherman Act . . . could be taken as a legislative indication of the proper direction." On the other hand, the Act "may be seen not as a prohibition of any specific conduct but as a general authority to do what common law courts usually do." Id. ¶ 301, at 6-7.
8. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, ¶ 306, at 81 (observing that "judges may sometimes be quite far at sea" with such economic concepts as "anticompetitive harm, procompetitive redeeming virtues, and less restrictive alternatives"); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 36 (The Free Press 1993) (1978) (arguing that the Sherman Act's evolution is "controlled by the progress of economic understanding"); Daniel A. Crane Of course, the fact that the Supreme Court retains ultimate interpretive authority does not make the judiciary a lone adventurer.
12 Enforcement agencies must also navigate the economic landscape to give content to the Act's prohibitions. 13 Not only does the text of the Act grant the judiciary largely unfettered interpretive leeway, it also affords enforcers unsettling discretion to determine whether conduct deserves criminal penalties 14 or civil remedies. 15 But given that the judiciary is generally comprised of high-level generalists rather than technology-forward economic experts, the judiciary may no longer be best equipped to play the leading role. 16 The judiciary is certainly apt to reason by way of analogy and precedent, but interpretation of the Sherman Act requires that adjudicators and norm-creators maintain an updated comprehension of prevailing economic theory and modern business practices. 17 
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[Vol. 94:1223 lend themselves to increased market concentration, 18 the regulatory task increasingly demands enlightened, data-driven analysis. 19 And against the judiciary's lack of economic expertise, the input of expert witnesses and third-party industry stakeholders have come to play an important role in the adjudication of Sherman Act cases. 20 Yet, even as ideas that were once indubitable have become the subjects of open debate, 21 none of this is to say that the Act should be tossed out entirely. An updated enforcement approach need not completely abandon traditional principles. 22 Shifts in the regulatory landscape over the past several decades are likely indications that the wilds have been tamed in significant ways. 23 Still, the combination of a widespread decline in competition, 24 27 An additional step toward taming the wilds-toward optimizing clarity, predictability, and outcomes -might be to shift the task of interpreting the Sherman Act to an antitrust agency.
28
This Note proceeds in four Parts. Part I outlines the interpretive difficulties spawned by the vagueness of the Sherman Act-particularly, the judiciary's necessary but undeniable departures from the text of the statute and the resulting doctrinal confusion. Part II considers ways in which the judiciary's decision-making in Sherman Act cases approximates agency rulemaking and whether it makes sense to delegate interpretive authority to an antitrust agency. Yet, while the agency solution has upside, it would not easily escape criticisms that the Act does not provide sufficient notice of the conduct it proscribes and that the Act is an impermissible delegation of legislative authority. 29 Part III examines these two hurdles, taking stock of separation of powers and void-for-vagueness principles. Part IV concludes.
I. DOCTRINAL CLARITY-OR NOT
It has always been true that Sherman Act cases are too complex for the judiciary to resolve with strict adherence to a literal reading of the text. 30 Because the text itself provides little direction, the judiciary has spent more than a century smoothing a "judicial gloss" over the Sherman Act's Constitution-like language. 31 When the judiciary updates Sherman Act common law with new insights, it acts, therefore, much like a legislative body. 32 Having spent years attempting to craft bright-line 34 This Part highlights some of the doctrinal and interpretive difficulties spawned by the Act's sparse guidance.
A. Departures from the Text
Generally speaking, Sherman Act section 1 doctrine has been defined by two purportedly distinct rules: the per se rule and the rule of reason. 35 Conduct such as naked price fixing, market allocation, and group boycotting is considered irredeemably anticompetive. 36 That is, the judiciary has decided that such conduct so consistently restrains trade that it violates section 1 regardless of circumstance. 37 To successfully prove that a defendant committed a per se violation, plaintiffs theoretically need only show that the conduct occurred. 38 On the other hand, some conduct could be considered beneficial to competition in light of extant market conditions and other surrounding circumstances. Under the rule of reason, plaintiffs must show that the conduct had an anticompetitive effect and that such effects outweigh any of the conduct's procompetitive benefits. 39 These two rules illustrate the judiciary's basic interpretation of the Sherman Act: the Act only prohibits unreasonable conduct that harms competition more than it promotes competition. 40 Whereas per se illegal conduct is characterized by its inherently unreasonable character, the rule of reason allows defendants to cast their behavior in the best possible light. 37. HOVENKAMP, supra note 10, at 233 ("The per se rule says that once we know a certain amount about a practice we can pass judgment on its legality without further inquiry."); see also, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v . . . combination . . . in restraint of trade." 42 The plain reading of that language was rejected early on when the judiciary reasoned instead that not every conceivable contract or combination is prohibited by the Act-only those that unreasonably restrain trade are prohibited. 43 From the standpoint of logic and policy, this interpretation is undoubtedly desirable. 44 Indeed, the function of all contracts is to restrain trade, and every market requires some degree of cooperation among those who might otherwise be competitors. 45 This interpretation is not, however, grounded in a strictly plain reading of the text.
Another major departure from the statute's text occurred later on with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 46 Keep in mind: in terms of criminal liability the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony." 47 The Gypsum defendants faced criminal sanctions under this provision for engaging in a per se illegal pricefixing scheme. 48 The 
B. "Bright-Line" Rules
Again, the Court's departures from the text of the statute can be characterized as practical responses to the difficulties of impracticable language. Commerce would surely be stifled if every contract in restraint of trade were made illegal, and much procompetitive conduct might be discouraged if even well-intentioned behavior triggered criminal sanctions. 52 But while the initial major departure involved what was an apparently clean distinction between two categories of conduct, the dichotomous per se versus rule of reason schema has gradually become less than clear. 53 The shift away from clean categories has most likely been impelled by the increased difficulty and complexity of Sherman Act cases. 54 Indeed, the Court has admitted that "our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like 'per se' . . . and 'rule of reason' tend to make them appear." 55 163 (2003) (observing that "the upsurge of antitrust economics has gone hand-in-hand with the abandonment of most per se rules"); Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 84 (describing "the growing inclination toward fulsome review of the facts" and the growing inclination of courts to "reject bright-line rules"); Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 7.
59. 220 U.S. 373, 409 (1911). The term "resale price maintenance" describes an agreement between a supplier and a retailer in which the retailer agrees not to discount a product's retail price below the level set by the supplier.
that RPM may carry procompetitive benefits in some situations and should therefore be analyzed under the rule of reason, rather than under the per se rule.
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In addition to RPM, the list of conduct once considered appropriate for strict per se analysis-but no longer considered as such-includes maximum price maintenance, 61 non-price vertical restraints, 62 and even some forms of horizontal restraints. For instance, while tying has traditionally been considered per se illegal, it is typically analyzed under a rule that is "per se" in name only. 63 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., the court declined to apply per se analysis to a blanket licensing arrangement that facilitated a fix on prices. 64 In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the Court declined to apply the per se rule to the NCAA's limitation on televising college football games, even though the limitation fixed price and restricted output. 65 The thing to take away from these cases is that although price fixing and other quintessential per se violations were once considered unquestionably anticompetitive, quintessentially anticompetitive behavior may be permitted if it is found to be economically efficient or beneficial. 66 But it's not just the deterioration of the per se rule that fosters confusion. Even the rule of reason does not provide significant clarity or predictability. In Ohio v. American Express Co., the Court followed an unprecedented application of the rule of reason by inserting the concept of two-sided markets. 67 The Court held that where a firm, such as a credit card company, serves different sets of customers in distinct but interrelated sides of a market, such as cardholders and merchants, plaintiffs must show that the defendant's conduct had anticompetitive effects in both sides of the market.
68 But prior to the Court's ruling in American Express, it had been generally understood that markets should be defined narrowly. The Court had explained in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States that even if a firm serves two sides of a market, the analysis should be carefully focused on the side of the market that
was harmed by the anticompetitive conduct. 69 This is exactly what the Court declined to do in American Express, even though nearly all markets can be understood as twosided. 70 The Court's adoption of a two-sided market theory is a slippery slope that may allow firms to demonstrate the reasonableness of their anticompetitive conduct if they can show that it only harmed one side of a two-sided market.
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Beyond the doctrinal confusion it causes, confusion over the rules' inner and outer contours has been experienced by firms in the form of increased litigation costs.
72
The value of the per se rule is attributable in part to the prelitigation cost savings generated by its simplicity: less to prove means less discovery, which limits parties' expenses and conserves judicial resources.
73 Indeed, as the Court has observed, the per se rule "avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industr[ies] involved" just to figure out whether particular conduct caused unreasonable harm to competition.
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But when everything is relevant, as it is under the rule of reason, the disposition of most cases is far from simple.
75 Doctrinal ambiguity and new conceptions of economic theory necessitate that courts wait until after discovery to determine whether the per se rule or the rule of reason should apply. 76 Even if a per se violation is alleged, parties cannot be sure whether a court will decide that per se analysis is appropriate until voluminous documents are assessed, several experts are consulted, and many facts are developed. 77 Thus, parties may end up litigating through discovery and absorbing the costs of rule of reason litigation nonetheless. 78 If only post-discovery rule determinations are possible, the per se rule forfeits the value of its cost-reducing function. 71. See Khan, supra note 18. For instance, if Uber instituted an exclusivity agreement prohibiting its drivers from also driving for Lyft, Uber drivers would be anticompetitively harmed. But Uber might be able to escape antitrust scrutiny if it could demonstrate that the other side of the market-riders-were not harmed by the exclusivity agreement. Given the dynamism of the interpretive approach Congress prescribed the Sherman Act, a relative lack of clarity and predictability is probably par for the course. 80 It has been argued, furthermore, that given Sherman Act interpreters' arduous task of applying murky doctrine to highly nuanced facts, a degree of confusion must be tolerated. 81 But requests for tolerance downplay the judiciary's limited ability to resolve complex economic issues by way of open-ended examinations into the costs and benefits of any particular course of conduct. 82 The judiciary seems, as a result, to have embraced the invitation to "ramble through the wilds."
83 Clean analytical categories have largely taken a backseat to a post-hoc, factintensive balancing approach. 84 As a result, the doctrine has become cluttered with "diverse and even contradictory strains,"
85 "decisions that now seem blunders," 86 and "substantial doctrinal confusion, if not plain error." 87 The judiciary's failure to appreciate the economics of restraints on trade and the methods by which colluders succeed creates a breeding ground for confusion. 88 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that the judiciary is "ill-equppied and illsuited" to "analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing interests and the endless data that [is] brought to bear on such decisions." 89 The reality is that in light of the alarming level of power held by firms wielding new technologies and new integrating a threshold "triaging" tool, which has asserted its own impact on the deterioration of the dichotomous structure of section 1. See Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 61. This preliminary inquiry, often referred to as the "quick look" rule, involves a truncated analysis which is more elaborate than per se examination, but not quite a full-fledged rule of reason analysis. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (observing that the basis for "abbreviated or 'quick look' analysis" was formed by the collection of FTC v. Ind. Fed Our increasingly modernized economy demands that our regulatory approach be updated in stride. 92 The gradual influx of microeconomics and post-hoc examination of facts has steadily increased the role economists and industry experts play in antitrust. 93 Yet, economic theories and microeconomic analyses are not always easily articulated to the judiciary. 94 More can be done to make Sherman Act regulation a formally expert-driven administrative enterprise rather than a generalist-driven adjudicative one. 95 A more optimal level of clarity and predictability might be achieved by integrating some level of antitrust agency rulemaking. 96 This Part briefly considers the idea that an agency rulemaking solution makes the most sense given that Sherman Act interpreters (the judiciary) and enforcers (the FTC and the DOJ) already approximate agency rulemaking to some degree.
A. Approximating Agency Rulemaking
First, like agencies during notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Court relies on external sources of analytical and empirical information to parse through difficult theoretical arguments. 97 Because the judiciary is comprised mostly of generalist judges, it must somehow make up for its lack of access to powerful empirical and analytical tools. 98 The outcomes they seek. 99 Naturally, then, the Court must often rely on third-party sources of information, such as academic studies and data. 100 The Court seems to place significant weight on the perspectives of interested parties who participate in antitrust cases as an amicus curiae. 101 As amici, trade associations, companies, professors, and others offer their own empirical data and perspectives. 102 Interested parties lobby the Court for a preferred rule much the way these same parties submit comments to administrative agencies. 103 But under the adjudicative approach, it is difficult to predict how an inexpert court will discriminate between opposing versions of an economic theory. 104 Leegin, which overturned the Court's century-old ban on RPM, is a good example of the Court's agency rulemaking approximation. 105 The Leegin Court relied significantly on amicus briefs signed by more than two dozen economists, 106 which theorized the procompetitive benefits of RPM and offered empirical data highlighting the costs of applying the per se rule to RPM. 107 The Court cited to the amici's arguments on multiple occasions, 108 demonstrating that the Court placed some weight on the amici's perspectives, much as an agency would do during noticeand-comment rulemaking. 109 More recently, in American Express, the majority opinion was littered with citations to secondary sources discussed by amici.
110 There, 99. Haw, supra note 9, at 1260. 100. See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2295 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that there is no support in antitrust law for treating a two-sided market as a singular whole).
101. See generally Stephen Calkins, The Antitrust Conversation, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 625 (2001) (examining the influence of amici in particular cases and noting that "[a]lthough many important antitrust cases were written without benefit of amici . . . amicus participation has helped shape the doctrine we apply every day"). See also Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 96 (observing that "amicus curiae briefs can exert considerable influence" and that "[a]ffected constituencies frequently attempt to shape antitrust decisions"); Haw, supra note 9 at 1248 (arguing that "help with understanding economic theory and interpreting empirical data on competition . . . comes from amicus briefs" which "often present more economic arguments than the parties' briefs" and which "receive considerable attention from the Court and influence its opinions").
102. Crane, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 20, at 96; Haw, supra note 9, at 1248. 103. See Haw, supra note 9, at 1259; see also Calkins, supra note 101, at 652 ("In fact, amici have long played a key role in addressing the intersection between the per se rule and the rule of reason.").
104. the Court's reliance on external theories to map out the concept of two-sided markets was clear. And, as in Leegin, where the Court completely departed from precedent, the American Express Court departed from earlier precedent instructing that market analysis should be defined narrowly. 111 Like the Court, the DOJ approximates certain aspects of formal rulemaking. Guidance documents promulgated by the DOJ bear resemblance to rulemakings but lack the benefits of formal notice and comment. 112 Take the DOJ's no-poach guidance, for example. 113 Published in 2016, the no-poach guidance alerted firms that agreements between employers to refrain from recruiting each other's employees would be subject to criminal sanctions. 114 Prior to 2016, no-poach agreements were only enforced by civil remedies. 115 Needless to say, spurred by the possibility of criminal fines or imprisonment, firms have scrambled to ensure compliance. 116 Even though the no-poach guidance is not a binding policy, 117 the DOJ has stuck to its word and begun pursuing firms that employ no-poaching agreements. 118 A major issue with the no-poach guidance is that it announced, almost without notice, a novel enforcement position and a new risk of criminal liability. Yet, interested and effected parties were not afforded a formal opportunity to weigh in. 119 Of course, whether the Supreme Court will ultimately interpret the Sherman Act such that no-poach agreements fall within the scope of its criminal prohibitions is unclear. 120 If the Court relies on amicus briefs in determining the criminality of nopoach agreements-briefs which may, for example, parse through theories of competition in low-skilled labor markets-one result may be heightened uncertainty among the governed public over the judiciary's willingness to acquiesce to DOJ enforcement positions that create new per se violations, as well as new criminally enforceable per se violations. The broader consequence: an even more blurred line between the per se rule and the rule of reason.
Clarity and predictability are paramount in a field as impactful and esoteric as antitrust. 121 To be sure, the text of the Sherman Act is so vague and so broad that it makes sense for the Court to draw on as much information as possible and for the DOJ to provide at least some clarity by way of guidance documents. 122 But if textual vagueness and judicial inability to perform empirical analyses necessitates reliance on expert input and guidance documents, it makes more sense to let the experts just write the rules in the first place. 123 Of course, leaving first-instance Sherman Act interpretation in the hands of the judiciary carries some advantages. Such advantages include the ability to "create law with actual facts in sight"; to remain "incremental, adaptive, and flexible"; to "disperse decisionmaking power" horizontally and vertically; and to avoid "agency-capture problems." 124 However, any such advantages can easily be construed as disadvantages as well. For example, dispersing decisionmaking power broadly is not significantly advantageous, if at all, if the decisionmakers lack the requisite expertise. And while an antitrust agency might be captured by industry interests, the judiciary can also be captured by intellectual or attitudinal trends. 125 For instance, as evidenced by the contemporary predominance of the consumer welfare standard, as opposed to a total welfare or competitive process standard, the Court was arguably "captured" by the Chicago School theories that came to prominence in the 1970s.
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While potential advantages of the adjudicative approach can be debated, the fact remains that the judiciary is unable to produce expert economic analyses on its own and must rely on outside input to solve complex economic issues. 127 The judiciary is not optimally positioned to resolve disputes over economic competition. 128 An antitrust agency, on the other hand, could write rules addressing RPM or two-sided markets or no-poach agreements after conducting its own studies and allowing interested parties to weigh in during notice and comment. As a result, the benefits of formal notice-and-comment rulemaking, clarity and predictability among them, might be realized more keenly than under the adjudicative model.
B. DOJ or FTC?
The difficult question concerns which agency should be authorized to promulgate rules under the Sherman Act. Congress's grant of regulatory authority to the FTC -an independent agency with both adjudicative power and rulemaking authority -reflects Congress's recognition that protecting consumer welfare requires specialized decision-making. 129 Plus, a series of hearings held by the FTC in the fall of 2018 and an expressed willingness to utilize its rulemaking capabilities reflects the sense that clearer and more effective rules are in order.
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One issue with the agency solution is that the FTC's Bureau of Competition awkwardly shares regulatory jurisdiction with the DOJ's Antitrust Division, but only the DOJ is authorized to enforce the Sherman Act's criminal provisions. In some ways, this adds to the difficultly faced by firms in predicting what kind of regulatory attention their conduct might invite. Not only are parties required to speculate as to whether their conduct will be subject to per se or rule of reason analysis, they also must speculate whether their cases will be heard by an Article III court or an administrative law judge. Still, the antitrust agencies have investigative abilities and subject matter expertise that the Court does not. 131 Though the mechanics of the agency solution are beyond the scope of this Note, shifting the authority to interpret the Sherman Act to the FTC or DOJ could facilitate the adoption of clearer, more predictable rules.
132 Indeed, the judiciary's reliance on amicus briefs in Sherman Act cases and the DOJ's use of nonbinding guidance documents may resemble agency decision-making enough that formalizing Sherman Act notice-and-comment rulemaking makes the most sense.
133 But apart from the mechanical issues of the agency solution, there might also be some constitutional obstacles. Part III considers whether the vagueness of the Sherman Act's language raises separation of powers and fairness concerns such that, absent a significant legislative update to the Act's language, the agency solution is a moot point.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS TO THE AGENCY SOLUTION
To be sure, the Sherman Act's sparse text and accompanying body of doctrine are not viewed across the board as problematic-at least not constitutionally problematic. 134 The prevailing view is that the Court's interpretive leeway is farreaching, but constitutionally permitted. 135 Nonetheless, the Act has been called an impermissibly broad delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutionally vague statute. 136 While it has not been successfully challenged on these grounds since its enactment, 137 vagueness attacks in light of its expanded coverage and the contemporary challenges of regulating competition. 138 
A. Impermissible Vagueness
The appropriateness of the Act's criminal penalties is not free from scrutiny, although the utility of its criminal penalties is plain enough. 139 Imprisonment of individual corporate officials surely deters reprehensible conduct in a way that issuing an injunction or dipping into a corporation's treasuries does not. 140 Yet, on its face, the Act's language does not purport to preclude the possibility that a defendant may be imprisoned after an ex post finding by a jury that his conduct was economically unreasonable-regardless of whether it was morally reprehensible. 141 If actualized, such a possibility might chill commercial conduct that would be economically beneficial to society and undeserving of the pain and stigma of criminal punishment. 142 Moreover, laws like the Sherman Act that do not clearly define their prohibitions may, in practical effect, impermissibly delegate fundamental policy questions to adjudicators for ad hoc resolution. 143 The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that criminal statutes be "sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties." 144 Generally speaking, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if "[persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." 145 But the Court does not apply the vagueness doctrine simplistically, and certain considerations may alleviate concerns over an otherwise vague statute. 146 For example, if the general class of conduct to which a statute is directed falls plainly within the statute's terms, the Court likely will not strike the statute just because marginal cases may raise doubts. 147 document declared that they warranted criminal sanctions. 160 Whether a non-binding guidance document constitutes sufficient notice that no-poach agreements are a crime is highly debatable. But interpretative developments like the no-poach guidance have arguably fashioned unlegislated crimes, signaling that the Act may not provide fair notice.
161

B. Controversiality of Administrative Crimes
Another issue implicated by the Sherman Act's criminal arm is that delegating interpretive authority to an antitrust agency may undermine basic philosophies of criminal liability. 162 Criminal punishment reflects society's contempt for certain conduct, but when a governmental body other than Congress is authorized to promulgate and enforce criminally punishable prohibitions, society's voice is not heard as loudly. 163 The Sherman Act was written with such generality that delegation to an antitrust agency without meaningfully updated language may do little more than authorize the agency to create controversial administrative crimes. 164 The Court has hesitated at times over the degree of deference it should afford to administrative crimes. 165 In Fahey v. Mallonee, for example, the Court postulated that delegation of rulemaking authority "might not be allowable to authorize creation of new crimes." 166 The Court later signaled in Touby v. United States that "greater congressional specificity [may be] required in the criminal context," but that precedent is unclear on this question. 167 The Court's hesitancy reflects concerns that the power to define crimes-that is, to codify the moral judgements of societyshould belong to Congress, rather than administrative agencies. 168 While agency administrators are often the top experts in their substantive fields, they are probably not the appropriate arbiters of society's moral persuasion. 169 Since Touby, the Court has not reconsidered the intelligible principle standard's low barrier in the context of agencies interpreting vague criminal statutes. But the possibility remains open. 170 At least three of the sitting Justices have since questioned the propriety of administrative crimes, as well as the efficacy of the nondelegation doctrine. 171 Despite no official condemnation of administrative crimes, the future possibility thereof could stymie a delegation of rulemaking authority to an antitrust agency.
C. Unguided Agency Authorizations
Notwithstanding the Sherman Act's dual criminal-civil character, it has long been recognized as a general principle that Congress cannot shift its legislative power to other branches of the federal government. 172 This principle, referred to as the nondelegation doctrine, is integral to the preservation of our tripartite system of government. 173 Yet, despite its importance, determining how and when to apply the nondelegation doctrine is not an easy task. 174 The Court struggled early on to draw a workable line between permissible and impermissible delegations. 175 Even after declaring it universally recognized that Congress cannot delegate legislative power, the Court eventually acquiesced to this line-drawing difficulty after the Great Depression. 176 The "intelligible principle" standard, by which the Court has traditionally determined whether a delegation offends the separation of powers, is extremely deferential to Congress's need for regulatory assistance. 177 Under this standard, a congressional delegation will be constitutionally agreeable so long as the enabling legislation contains an explicit and intelligible principle to guide the agency as it exercises the regulatory authority conferred upon it. 178 Intelligible principles need not be articulated with any serious specificity. For instance, Congress authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission to ensure holding companies' corporate structures do not "unduly or unnecessarily complicate" or "unfairly or inequitably distribute" shareholders' voting power. 179 Similarly, the Federal Communications Commission was charged with regulating broadcast licensing according to "public interest, convenience, or necessity." 180 The Court held that the intelligible principle standard had been satisfied in both instances.
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The text of the Sherman Act may not, to the contrary, contain an ostensible intelligible principle. 182 The Act broadly prohibits conduct "in restraint of trade" without defining restraint of trade and without mentioning, for example, public standard in the Act. And there was no consensus on the Court before 1979 that it should be singularly guided by the goal of maximizing consumer welfare. 195 Of course, Congress could insert a consumer welfare provision into the Sherman Act. The likelihood of this, however, is low-especially in light of energized calls for a reformulated standard that measures welfare more holistically. 196 Either way, the Sherman Act's language does not explicitly state a guiding standard at all. Without such, a delegation of interpretive authority to an antitrust agency may run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The Sherman Act, by its vague and sweeping language, is a broad delegation of authority to the Supreme Court. Congress sent us into the wilderness-law students and generalist judges alike. In light of swelling desire for the antitrust laws to be more effective against modern-day competition foes, Congress should update the Sherman Act. The common-law approach has not achieved the stability one would expect of a statute levying hefty criminal sanctions, and the Court appears to approximate agency rulemaking on an increasingly frequent basis. Delegating rulemaking authority to an antitrust agency may be a viable solution. But there are some draw backs-namely constitutional objections to which the Sherman Act may be vulnerable, especially if an agency delegation were not accompanied by some level of additional statutory clarity. Even if the agency solution proves unworkable, Congress should address head-on the growing need for clarity, predictability, and stability, which the Sherman Act significantly fails to provide.
and as documented by a vast body of scholarship.").
195. See Khan, supra note 27, at 718. The "market-structure based understanding of competition" was foundational through the 1960s. Id. Congress was likely concerned more with suppliers' welfare than consumers' when it enacted the Sherman Act. See, e.g., AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 184, ¶ 101, at 9-11 ("Although the drafters of the Sherman Act were concerned about injury to consumers, they were significantly more concerned about various kinds of injury to competitors."); Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Re-Examination of the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359, 359 (1993) .
196. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 27.
